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SPECIAL ISSUE ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE

DEBORAH HELLMAN† & DAVID SCHULTZ‡
INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMS IN THE EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
This year marks the fortieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s seminal
money-in-politics case, Buckley v. Valeo1—an anniversary that coincides with
a presidential election that promises to be the most expensive in U.S. history
and one dominated by big money.2 At the same time, the death of Justice
Scalia presents the country with an unexpected vacancy that could change the
balance of the Court. Now is an especially apt time to examine the role of the
Justices in creating our current approach to money in politics and to propose
and evaluate transformative alternatives.
The overwhelming majority of Americans are unhappy with the current
political system, viewing it as corrupt.3 Today, wealthy interests and
individuals are able to translate wealth into influence and thereby distort
policy. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the wealthy have different
policy preferences than the broader public, and are more likely to succeed in
getting those policy preferences enacted into law.4 Candidates spend their
time soliciting large contributions from a wealthy, disproportionately white,
†
‡

D. Lurton Massee and F.D. G. Ribble Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.
Professor of Political Science, Hamline University; Associate Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota Law School.
1 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2 See The 2016 Presidential Money Race, ECONOMIST (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.economist.com
/node/21694201 [https://perma.cc/K6C2-LJW7] (estimating that the campaign will cost $5 billion,
or “more than double the cost of the 2012 campaign”).
3 Greg Stohr, Bloomberg Poll: Americans Want Supreme Court to Turn Off Political Spending Spigot,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-09-28/
bloomberg-poll-americans-want-supreme-court-to-turn-off-political-spending-spigot.
4 See generally MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012).
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“donor class” who constitute less than 1% of the population, wasting time that
could be spent more productively and simultaneously developing a skewed
impression of the views and values of the people they serve.5 Candidates who
run for office are likely to be wealthy and white; it is difficult for working-class
candidates to amass the resources they need to compete with opponents
backed by big money.6
The Supreme Court is largely responsible for this situation. Its 1976
decision in Buckley struck down limits on campaign spending, starting down
the path of equating spending with speaking.7 At least as damaging as
Buckley’s facile assumption that because speaking costs money, limits on
spending are tantamount to limits on speaking, however, was its blindness to
the constitutional values other than free speech at play in the campaign
finance context. In Buckley, appellees argued that several compelling
government interests justified the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election
Campaign Act, including the interest in equalizing, as far as practicable, the
relative ability of all voters to produce political outcomes they favor.8 The
Buckley Court disagreed, recognizing preventing corruption, or its
appearance, as the only government interest to justify limits on big money in
politics and explicitly rejecting the equality interest as “wholly foreign to the
First Amendment.”9
This narrow, “anticorruption” framework has guided money-in-politics
decisions for the past forty years, with anti-democratic results. The
framework ignores the fact that large differences in wealth or access to wealth
give some people dramatically more influence on politics than others. As a
result, the Justices have relied on Buckley to take a slew of common-sense
policy reforms off the table, such as limiting how much individuals and
candidates can spend on elections,10 banning corporate or lobbyist
contributions,11 limiting the total amount a single individual can contribute

5 See Adam Lioz, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: How the Supreme Court Helped Create the Inequality
Era and Why a New Jurisprudence Must Lead Us Out, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1227, 1244-46 (2013)
(describing the features, coherence, and power of the “donor class”).
6 Id.; ADAM LIOZ & KAREN SHANTON, DEMOS & U.S. PIRG, THE MONEY CHASE:
MOVING FROM BIG MONEY DOMINANCE IN THE 2014 MIDTERMS TO A SMALL DONOR
DEMOCRACY 5 (2015), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/TheMoneyChase-Report
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM73-L4SG].
7 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976).
8 Brief for Appellees Ctr. for Pub. Fin. of Elections, Common Cause, League of Women
Voters, et al. at 9-11, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (Nos. 75-436, 75-437), 1975 WL 171457.
9 424 U.S. at 48-49.
10 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248-253 (2006) (plurality opinion); Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296-99 (1981).
11 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 345-48 (2010); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 790-95 (1978).
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in any given election cycle (“aggregate contribution limits”),12 or granting
extra public financing to candidates who face big spending.13 The Roberts
Court has used Buckley’s narrow conception of corruption to invalidate
practically all of the campaign finance regulations that have come before it.
The vision of democracy implicit in the Court’s money-in-politics cases
is neither faithful to the Constitution, nor normatively attractive. Perhaps for
these reasons, it is also in tension with the Court’s rulings in the voting and
districting arenas.14 As David Schultz articulates in his contribution to this
Issue, lurking in the Court’s money-in-politics jurisprudence is a vision of a
neoliberal, “free market democracy.”15 In cases like Buckley and Citizens United,
the only democratic value recognized is the First Amendment, which is
reduced to free speech, then further reduced to the freedom to spend money
in a marketplace that is “as free as possible, limited only by the need to
prevent quid pro quo corruption.”16 But simply saying the First Amendment
always wins is not an adequate or complete vision of American democracy.
The Court has failed to balance the freedom to spend money on elections
with other vital democratic values, such as equality, effective participation,
representation, or pluralism. Some of these competing values have been
recognized in other democracy-law cases: from the One Person, One Vote
cases, which were guided by political equality;17 to evaluating laws preventing
campaigning around polling places, which balanced freedom of expression and
the electoral integrity;18 to the White Primary cases, which balanced associational
rights of political parties with equal protection rights of individuals.19
I. PURPOSES OF THIS ISSUE
The Supreme Court’s misguided analysis in Buckley and its progeny is
neither inevitable nor irreversible. The Court has changed course on the
status of rights to economic liberty (through the disavowal of Lochner),20 the
permissibility of racial segregation,21 and on LGBTQ rights,22 among many
12
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McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445-46 (2014).
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826-28 (2011).
Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV.
1385, 1407, 1421 (2013).
15 David Schultz, The Case for a Democratic Theory of American Election Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 259, 261 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-259.pdf.
16 Id. at 262 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
17 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
18 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
19 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
20 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (departing from Lochner’s approach
by overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
21 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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other arenas. In light of the current vacancy on the Supreme Court, and the
likelihood of additional vacancies in the coming years, there is a very real
chance that a democracy-friendly Court could forge a new path on money in
politics as well.
This Special Issue will explore two promising alternatives to Buckley’s
anticorruption framework, each of which could potentially justify more
robust protections against the dominance of big money: Political Equality
and Self-Government. Under a Political Equality framework, the Court could
hold that the people may limit big money in elections to promote equal
citizenship, equal opportunity to influence elections or run for office, or equal
political voice.23 Under a Self-Government framework, the Court could hold
campaign finance regulations constitutional on the grounds that our
Constitution’s protection of the positive liberty of self-government permits
the people’s representatives to prevent economic success from translating into
political influence.
This Issue will begin to address some of the difficult questions raised by
each of these alternatives, explore the relationship between the two, and
explore possibilities for a more coherent democracy law jurisprudence.
Together, these pieces are meant to spark a conversation. Many of the authors
will continue the interchange in person at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School in May 2016, but we hope that the exchange of ideas will be ongoing.
II. POLITICAL EQUALITY
The Buckley Court explicitly rejected a government interest in promoting
political equality. But, in the words of former Judge J. Skelly Wright,
“[p]olitical equality is the cornerstone of American democracy.”24 Under the
Buckley framework, low-income and wealthy Americans do not come to the
political table as equals. As election law expert and contributing author
Daniel Tokaji has observed, “[i]f one accepts the proposition that money
enables campaign-related speech, its corollary is that those without money
lack the ability to speak.”25 Individuals have as much freedom to speak as the
size of their bank accounts allows, leaving some with little to no freedom to
23 The idea of equal citizenship is distinct from the idea that each person should have equal
voice or actual influence on the political outcome. Rather, equal citizenship requires that people
function as equals. Political equality as equal citizenship might, for instance, draw from Ronald
Dworkin’s idea that it is equal political standing that matters. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR
HEDGEHOGS 388 (2011) (explaining one conception of political equality as “demand[ing] that the
community divide political power, not necessarily equally, but in a way that treats people as equals”).
24 J. Skelly Wright, Money and The Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to
Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 625 (1982).
25 Daniel P. Tokaji, The Obliteration of Equality in American Campaign Finance Law: A Trans-Border
Comparison, 5 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 381, 383 (2011).
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speak, and others with potentially limitless freedom to speak. Academics and
reformers alike have argued that the Court must change course and accept
political equality as a valid reason for Congress to regulate money in politics,
and new research on the growing wealth divide and stark differentials in
government responsiveness may give the justices reason to do so.
In his piece for this Issue, First Amendment Freeze Play: Bennett’s Strategy
for Entrenching Inequality, Frank Pasquale discusses the Court’s misguided
First Amendment analysis in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC
v. Bennett26: a case striking down an Arizona law offering additional funding
to publicly funded candidates if their privately financed opponents exceeded
a certain spending threshold.27 He argues that the Court in Bennett
improperly expanded Buckley’s rejection of the equality rationale and in so
doing, further entrenched existing inequalities in the United States.
In How Sausage Is Made: A Research Agenda for Campaign Finance and
Lobbying, authors Daniel Tokaji and Renata Strause explore what building an
empirical record to support a Political Equality framework might entail, and
whether such empirical record is materially different from the record needed
to support distinct alternative frameworks.28
III. SELF-GOVERNMENT
Unlike political equality, the Self-Government theory was not explicitly
considered by the Buckley Court, and has been the subject of far less
scholarship. In Resurrecting the Neglected Liberty of Self-Government, Deborah
Hellman argues that our Constitution protects two types of liberties: a
negative liberty to be left alone and a positive liberty of self-government.29
In campaign finance cases these two liberties are both at issue. Yet, current
campaign finance jurisprudence pays attention only to the negative liberty of
free speech, neglecting—at great cost—the positive liberty of citizens to
insulate the democratic arena from market influences or to protect our
government from becoming a plutocracy. A new jurisprudence would
acknowledge the dynamic tension between the positive and negative liberties
at stake in campaign finance cases.

26
27

131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
Frank Pasquale, First Amendment Freeze Play: Bennett’s Strategy for Entrenching Inequality,
164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 215 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-RevOnline-215.pdf.
28 Daniel P. Tokaji & Renata E. B. Strause, How Sausage Is Made: A Research Agenda for
Campaign Finance and Lobbying, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 223 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.
com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-223.pdf.
29 Deborah Hellman, Resurrecting the Neglected Liberty of Self-Government, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 233, 233 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-233.pdf.
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In Wholly Native to the First Amendment: The Positive Liberty of Self-Government,
Tabatha Abu El-Haj posits that the positive liberty of self-government is
quintessentially a First Amendment interest, as the Amendment protects the
conditions necessary for self-governance.30 She also explores the challenges
of operationalizing a Self-Government framework doctrinally, including the
dangers of affording too much deference to democratic bodies.
In The Federalism Implications of Campaign Finance Regulation, Franita
Tolson explores how self-governance principles coupled with the Tenth
Amendment of the Constitution allow states more leeway to set campaign
finance rules than federal legislatures.31 She argues that, under our system of
federalism, a state may set campaign finance rules that are consistent with,
and protective of, the form of governance that state has chosen, which often
includes more avenues for direct democracy than governance at the federal level.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA
One obstacle that might prevent even a democracy-friendly Court from
adopting a Political Equality framework is the implications of such a
framework on the contemporary media. For instance, if Congress passed a
law requiring that all electoral communications be financed according to
equitable spending limits, should it exempt news outlets like the New York
Times or the Washington Post? Must it under the First Amendment? Does
exemption provide the owners of such outlets with an unequal voice? How
could Congress fairly draw a line between those who qualify as “media” and
those who do not? And how could this inconsistent treatment be justified? In
The Media Exemption Puzzle of Campaign Finance Laws, Sonja West crystallizes
these points, positing that the media exemption problem is one of both
definition and justification—who should be included in the “media,” and do
they deserve additional freedom to spend money on elections that non-media
speakers do not?32 West argues that media speakers should be afforded additional
constitutional protections, and that the definitional problem is solvable.
Perhaps under a Self-Government framework, the media exemption
becomes less thorny; deciding to exempt the media from money-in-politics
regulations would seemingly fall within the purview of the democratic
branches of government to set the rules of democracy.
30 Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Wholly Native to the First Amendment: The Positive Liberty of Self-Government,
164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 241 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-RevOnline-241.pdf.
31 Franita Tolson, The Federalism Implications of Campaign Finance Regulation, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 247 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-247.pdf.
32 Sonja R. West, The Media Exemption Puzzle of Campaign Finance Laws, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 253 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-253.pdf.
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V. DEMOCRATIC THEORY
Finally, this Issue also explores the impoverished, neoliberal theory of
democracy implicit in the Court’s money-in-politics jurisprudence. In The
Case for a Democratic Theory of American Election Law, David Schultz suggests
that a broader theory of democracy could combat the free market vision of
democracy implicit in the Court’s money-in-politics decisions, and offers a
variety of democratic values and definitions that could come into play in a
theory of American democracy.33
In Sources of Conservative Thinking on Democracy, Stephen Gottlieb further
explores how free market analyses undermine democracy, and are occasionally
openly hostile to it.34 He argues that in response to the neoliberal attack on
democracy, reformers must advance alternative constitutional frameworks
that embody notions of popular self-government and egalitarianism.
In Justice Kennedy’s Democratic Dystopia, Terry Smith examines the
democracy envisioned by Justice Kennedy in Citizens United: a democracy in
which disparate access and favoritism are normal, inevitable, unavoidable, and
untouchable by regulation. Smith explores the flaws in Kennedy’s analysis,
including detachment from practical and empirical realities.35
While the Court’s free market approach to money-in-politics cases might
be inconsistent with other types of democracy rulings, it is unfortunately
more pervasive than just money-in-politics cases. In A Locked iPhone;
Unlocked Corporate Constitutional Rights, Ciara Torres-Spelliscy explores how a
parallel, neoliberal analyses led to increased corporate rights with no concomitant
responsibilities.36 She posits this trend is exemplified by the recent dispute
between Apple and the FBI and in cases like Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.37
CONCLUSION
The papers in this Issue are intended to ask more questions than they
answer. There is plenty more work to be done by legal scholars, empiricists,
judges, and practicing lawyers to point the way to a new money-in-politics
jurisprudence that is better grounded in the Constitution, more coherent, and

33 Schultz, supra note 15.
34 Stephen E. Gottlieb, Sources of Conservative Thinking on Democracy, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 269 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-269.pdf.
35 Terry Smith, Justice Kennedy’s Democratic Dystopia, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 281 (2016),

http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-281.pdf.
36 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, A Locked iPhone; Unlocked Corporate Constitutional Rights, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. ONLINE 287 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-287.pdf.
37 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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more sustaining to our democracy than the Supreme Court’s current
approach. We hope to start a conversation, and we invite you to join us.
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